22.3.20

What is Terrorism ? Martin Purbrick

What is Terrorism ?

Martin Purbrick


It seemed easier to define terrorism in 1990 when I was an Inspector in Special Branch working in counter terrorism intelligence. Terrorism was a clearly identifiable threat and the terrorists were clearly identifiable people and groups.

During 1990/91 "Gulf War One", when Iraq was defeated by US and coalition forces, in Special Branch we were on high alert because of the threat of terrorism but no attacks occurred in Hong Kong despite the British involvement in the war against Iraq and the complex network of Arab terrorist support stretching from the Middle East even to business contacts in Hong Kong.

Terrorist threats were largely related to the Middle East, mainly from Hezbollah (sponsored by Iran), as well as the multitude of Palestinian terrorist groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (which had by then renounced terrorism but had a complicated membership of many sub-groups), Abu Nidal Organisation (led by the violent Sabri Al-Banna), the Palestine Liberation Front (led by Ahmed Jibril, responsible for the hijack of the Achile Lauro cruise ship in 1985), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (led by the charismatic George Habash who masterminded the Dawson's Fields hijacking of five Western airliners which inspired terrorist hijacking of planes).

Ramzi Yousef, one of the leaders of the first attack on the World Trade Centre in New York in 1993, was guided by his uncle Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who was the mastermind of the 9/11 airline attacks on the same building in 2001. They also plotted to organize "Operation Bojinka" in 1994 which if it had been successful would have destroyed twelve commercial planes originating from Asia on the same day. Both men established a network of contacts across cities in Asia, which showed that Hong Kong was not immune to the terrorist threat. Khalid Sheikh Mohamed later became a member of Al Qaeda in the mid-1990s.

In the early 1990s Al-Qaeda was not yet known to us in Special Branch. Osama Bin Laden's growth of Al Qaeda as a permanent jihadist force came after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia invited US military forces to the country for defence. Bin Laden offered the Saudi royal family a force of Arab mujahedeen veterans as the core of a force against Iraq, but the offer was rejected. If Saddam Hussein had not invaded Kuwait, Bin Laden may not have been presented with an opportunity to wage jihadist war. The failure to withdraw US troops from Saudi Arabia immediately after the defeat of Iraq led to Bin Laden turning against the Saudi royal family and added to Arab support for Al Qaeda. The "myth of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda" was enhanced as he stood up to the House of Saud as well as the USA.

By 1991, Bin Laden had moved Al Qaeda to Sudan at the invitation of the government, which wanted their skills to train soldiers to fight in the country's civil war. The years in Sudan provided Al Qaeda with the time and a base to coordinate terrorist attacks against wider targets. In 1992 two hotels in Aden, Yemen, where US soldiers transited to Somalia, were bombed by the "Islamic Army Shura", some of whose members had trained at an Al Qaeda camp in Somalia. In November 1995 an attack on a National Guard base in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, was attributed to supporters of Bin Laden. In June 1996 a truck bomb attack at Khobar Towers, Dhahran, involved Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda trainers entered Somalia to assist warlords fighting US forces. Bin Laden even claimed that in 1993 Al Qaeda fighters were responsible for the attacks on US military helicopters in Mogadishu, Somalia, but this was most likely an attempt to add to the myth of Al Qaeda by associating the movement with the battle that led to the exit of US forces from Somalia.

From 1996 to 2001, Al Qaeda had a base in Afghanistan to organize, consolidate, and plan strategy for attacks on the "far enemy" USA. Al Qaeda was able to develop alliances with other jihadist groups in preparation for more widespread conflict with the USA. In February 1998, Bin Laden issued the "declaration of war against Americans". The declaration was signed by the "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders", which was an umbrella group for Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian Jama at Islamiyah, and others from Kashmir and Pakistan.

The 1998 statement was a brilliant piece of propaganda to attract, influence, and motivate Muslims to a common cause with Al Qaeda in a wide alliance against the USA. Al Qaeda became increasingly adept at the use of propaganda to create a climate in which groups and individuals would carry out attacks on behalf of Al Qaeda, creating a force multiplier in the asymmetric conflict with the more militarily powerful USA.

The resulting terror was illustrated in the bomb attacks on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, the bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, in October 2000, and the aircraft hijackings and suicide attacks in September 2001 in New York, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania. These attacks were great propaganda for Al Qaeda, which had shown frustrated Muslims around the world that the superpower USA could be successfully attacked. Attacks either by Al Qaeda core members or affiliated groups continued from 2002 in Tunisia, Pakistan, Yemen, Bali, and Kenya; in 2003 in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Indonesia, and Turkey; in 2004 in the Philippines, Spain, and Saudi Arabia; in 2005 in London, Egypt, and Jordan; in 2007 in Algeria; and in 2008 in Pakistan. After the 9/11 attacks Al Qaeda was not only a terrorist organisation, it became a global terrorist franchise with branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates.

Although Al Qaeda had great success it was doomed by trying to fight against the USA. Terrorists who challenge an established state rarely succeed and their violent action inevitably leads to defeat as the resources of the state are mobilized against a common enemy. Al Qaeda was without doubt a terrorist organisation, evidenced by the 1998 "declaration of war against Americans", but often terrorism and terrorists are difficult to define.

For instance, following the attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, in September 2012, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton said "Was it because of a protest, or was it because of guys out for a walk one night who decided they'd go kill some Americans? What difference, at this point, does it make?" It made a difference to Republican critics of how the administration of President Obama perceived the attack, either as an out of control violent political protest or a premeditated terrorist act, and hence the importance of objective distinction between terrorism and other forms of political violence.

War between states or tribes, civil war between populations of a country, revolution, insurgency, violent political protests, riots, and terrorism are all forms of "political violence". Terrorism is subset of political violence, and violence may occur without terror but not terror without violence.

A "Terrorist act" has been defined in law in Hong Kong as: The action is carried out with the intention of, or the threat is made with the intention of using action that would have the effect of (A) causing serious violence against a person; (B) causing serious damage to property; (C) endangering a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action; (D) creating a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; (E) seriously interfering with or seriously disrupting an electronic system; or (F) seriously interfering with or seriously disrupting an essential service, facility or system, whether public or private; and (ii) the use or threat is (A) intended to compel the Government or an international organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the public; and (B) made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

The lengthy legal definition contrasts with the simpler definition of the late Professor Paul Wilkinson of the University of St. Andrews, which is "Terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service political ends." Terrorism expert Alex Schmid has collated 109 different definitions of terrorism in his 1984 book on the subject. What does this mean in Hong Kong and do any of the violent acts associated with pro-democracy and anti-government protests resemble terrorism?

The legal definition is not sufficient to invoke the emotional term "terrorism" as it can include political violence that does not meet the standards of objective understandings of terrorism. The protester violence that occurred in 2019 caused damage to property, endangered lives, created a risk to the safety of the public, interfered with electronic systems (for instance traffic lights), and was intended to intimidate and compel the Hong Kong Government in relation to five demands that were political. But so did the 2019 "Yellow Vest" protests in France, the "October Revolution" protests in Iraq, and the violent protests in Chile that originated from public dissatisfaction regarding inequality. There is no compelling reason that the political violence in these events should be termed as "terrorism".

This raises the question of why the Police in Hong Kong have claimed that the political violence in Hong Kong could be categorized as "terrorism". In March 2020, the Police raided multiple locations and seized three bombs, each containing 1.5kg of explosives, with three remote-controlled devices, as well as 2.6 tons of chemicals with six bottles of drain cleaner and 60 electric matches. The Police stated that they were linked to bomb plots in January and February, involving an explosion at Caritas Medical Centre in Cheung Sha Wan, and devices found at Shenzhen Bay border crossing and Lo Wu railway station (one of which caught fire and spurted white smoke). Many other weapons intended for violence and to cause harm have also been seized by the Police in the past six months. These plots were not however at all successful and involved amateurish planning.

The Police and the Government are equating all political violence with terrorism, reflected in a press release on the law and order situation on 2 March 2020 which said "Violent acts committed by the protestors changed from throwing water bottles and other objects to hurling bricks and mills barriers or even petrol bombs, corrosive liquids and shooting arrows. Some members of the public refused to condemn such behaviours and as a result violence escalated to genuine firearms, bullets and explosives. In order to express their dissatisfaction with the society and the government, rioters chose to hurt the public and cause social panic which exactly is the behaviour of home-grown terrorism."

Expressing dissatisfaction, using violence and causing social panic is not the legal definition of terrorism, nor is it close to any of the other many definitions of terrorism. This reflects how difficult it is to define terrorism, and why no agency such as the Police should be left to do so on their own terms. Defining terrorism is subjective and the Police, who have been the targets of protest violence leading on many occasions to officers losing self-control, have an emotional bias towards invoking the term. The definition of terrorism in any circumstances must be made after review by political leaders, the executive arm of government, the legislature, the department of justice, the police, and then ultimately decided by the courts.

What is absent in the political violence in Hong Kong is an organisation or conspiratorial cell structure or a collection of individuals motivated by a terrorist movement. The sad and clumsy bomb making efforts efforts of a few disenchanted and misguided young people in Hong Kong are not in any way similar to Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, ISIS, who are the real terrorists we know. This is not terrorism in Hong Kong.

About the author:

Martin Purbrick is a former Royal Hong Kong Police officer, whose work included counter terrorism in Special Branch and triad society research in the Criminal Intelligence Bureau from 1988 to 2000. For the past 18 years he has been employed by various major companies in corporate security roles and he now operates his own company.





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